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INTRODUCTION 
The common-law, as it has evolved from the Eighteenth Century, is 
that school districts are imnrune from tort liability because they are 
a functioning part of the state. At this time, however, there are a 
great many changes taking place in the laws throughout the country. 
Some states have completely abrogated the doctrine of tort immunity 
while others have done so only in part. In Utah the laws have only 
recently been changed but are not in effect until July l, 1966. 
There are divided feelings, even among administrators, as to 
whether or not schools should be liable for tort. The magazine 
11:!!, Nation's Schools reported an opinion poll taken in 1961 that 
brings out this fact. The findings were as follows: 
1. As a question of ethics (regardless of your present 
state statutes) do you believe that school districts should be 
liable for property damage or personal injuries (torts)? 
Yes, 42% No, 58% 
2. Should school districts be required to carry insurance 
covering such liabilities? 
Yes, 49% No, 50% No opinion, 1% 
As a matter of ethics school districts should not be held 
liable for property damage or personal injuries, believes 58% 
of the administrators responding to the February opinion poll. 
Nor should districts be required to carry insurance covering 
such liabilities, according to 50% of the respondents. (The 
Nation's Schools, p. 112) 
~1.2!.study 
It is important for school officials and employees to understand 
the various facets of the immunity law. Today more than ever the 
governmental immunity law is being challenged and a few states have 
abrogated it, in total or in part, either by statute or by judicial 
decree. 
Purpose.£!. study 
This study will review the literature with respect to changes in 
the concept of tort liability of governmental agencies for act of 
negligence. Emphasis will be placed upon the public school district 
as one type of public agency. 
Delimitation 
This paper will be limited to landmark court cases, significant 
legislative acts in various states, and to specific legislation and 
court rulings in Utah. 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Many educators have little idea how or why schools have become 
inunune from tort liability. This immunity can be traced to the 
Eighteenth Century in England and in America to an 1812 case in 
Massachusetts. This origin is referred to in the Spanel v. Mounds 
View School District case. when the court commented as follows: 
All of the paths leading to the origin of governmental tort 
immunity converge on Russell v. The Men of Devon. 100 Eng. Rep. 
359, 2 T.R. 667 (1788). This product of the English common law 
was left on our doorstep to become the putative ancestor of a long 
line of American cases beginning with Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 
247 (1812). Russell sued all of the male inhabitants of the 
County of Devon for damages occurring to his wagon by reason of a 
bridge being out of repair. It was apparently undisputed that the 
county had a duty to maintain such structures. The court held 
that the action would not lie because: (1) to permit it would 
lead to "an infinity of actions," (2) there was no precedent for 
attempting such a suit, (3) only the legislature should impose 
liability of this kind, (4) even if defendents are to be con-
sidered a corporation or quasi-corporation there is no fund out 
of which to satisfy the claim, (5) neither law nor reason supports 
the action, (6) there is a strong presumption that what has never 
been done cannot be done, and (7) although there is a legal 
principle which permits a remedy for every injury resulting from 
the neglect of another, a more applicable principle is "that it 
is better than an individual should sustain an injury than that 
the public should suffer an inconvenience." The court concluded 
that the suit should not be permitted "because ~ action ~ -2.!t 
brought against !!!!_ public." (Italics supplied.) There is no 
mention of the "King can do no wrong," but on the contrary it is 
suggested that the plaintiff sue the county itself rather than 
its individual inhabitants. Every reason assigned by the court 
is born of expediency. The wrong to plaintiff is submerged in 
the convenience of the public. No moral, ethical or rational 
reason for the decision is advanced by the court except the 
practical problem of assessing damages against individual defend-
ants. The court's invitation to the legislature has a familiar 
ring. It was finally accepted as to claims against the Crown 
in 1947, although Russell had long since been overruled. (Garber, 
1964, P• 235-236) 
The meaning of the theory that "the king can do no wrong" is the 
concept that the crown could not be summoned in his own courts without 
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his consent. This is still applied today. Inasmuch as school 
districts are considered instrumentalities of the state, they share the 
soverign immunity enjoyed by it under this theory. 
School districts are quasi-corporations as provided for in the 
constitution and set up by the legislature of the state. As such they 
are clothed with the same degree of immunity as any other political 
subdivision of the state. In short, school boards are part of the 
machinery of state government operating at the local level as an 
agency of the state in the performance of public function. The charac-
ter of their functions, the extent, and duration of their power rests 
exclusively with the state legislature. (Garber, 1964, p. 235) 
The immunity rule protects school districts from suits unless 
liability is expressly imposed upon them by the legislature or by 
court decision. Some courts have expressed grave doubt as to whether 
the legislature could validly authorize the bringing of tort action 
against school boards without amending the constitution. This ruling 
is predicated upon the requirement of the constitution and statutes 
that school funds be disbursed solely for the support and maintenance 
of public schools, and the provisions prohibiting the enactment of any 
law authorizing the diversion of school funds to any other than school 
purposes. It was established in the Buck v. McLean, 115 So. (2d) 764 
(1959) case, that courts have assumed the immunity of torts before 
them on this point. The assumption is that the use of funds to pay 
damages caused by the negligence of school officials or employees is 
not a use of those funds for school purposes. 
There are only a few other principles of jurisprudence criticized 
as much as the doctrine of governmental inununity for tort. How could a 
modem country like the United States keep a common-law rule without 
change for so many years? Tort immunity was so deeply entrenched in 
case law from its beginning in the Eighteenth Century England that 
even the beginning of change was slow. In Utah, for example, the 
inununity laws will not have any change until July 1, 1966, and 
although the Supreme Court of Minnesota announced the abrogation of a 
common-law rule of immunity in that state for a short time, the 
Minnesota 1963 Legislature stayed the abrogation until 1968 in order 
to allow an appointed committee to complete their report to the 
Legislature. 
In recent years some of the states have changed this cormnon-law 
ruling which, as Professor Borchard puts it, is "one of the mysteries 
of legal evolution." (Borchard Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 
Yale L.J. 1, 4) 
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HOW NEGLIGENCE IS DETERMINED 
An act or omission which violates the private rights of an in-
dividual is called a tort. The appropriate remedy for this violation 
is a court action for damages. In the main, torts are based upon or 
grow out of negligence. When school districts are affected, it is 
usually the result of negligence of school officials or employees. 
Therefore it is important that negligence be better understood. 
fil!_!t constitutes negligence 
Negligence is placed in two categories, (a) misfeasance, an act 
which a reasonable man would have realized involved an unreasonable 
risk of injury to others, and (b) nonfeasance, failure to do an act 
which is necessary to protect or assist another and which one is 
under duty to do. 
Negligence, then, is any conduct which is not up to the standards 
that a regular prudent employee or official would exercise in the 
same or similar circumstances. The negligence is inherent in the act, 
whether it involves unreasonable risk of harm to others even though it 
is done with reasonable care, skill, preparation, and warning. 
In order to establish negligence it must be shown that the 
defendant is the legal cause of the injury. The legal cause is "that 
cause among all the antecedent events which in the natural and contin-
uous sequence of events, without the interference of an independent 
superseding cause, provided the dame." (NEA Research Division, 1963, 
P• 12) 
An employee or official may not be held personally liable unless 
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it be alleged and proved that his act, or failure to act, was corrupt 
or malicious, or that he acted outside of and beyond the scope of his 
duties. This rule is sound. If it were otherwise, few persons would 
be willing to accept positions as members of boards of education, and 
assume the risk of personal liability if they were proven to have acted 
negligently, though in good faith, in the performance of their duties. 
(Hamilton and Mort, 1959, p. 292) 
The courts, in deciding whether there is negligence, consider 
three main factors: the nature of the conduct, the legal cause of the 
injury, and the foreseeability of the harm. (NEA Research Division, 
1963, p. 10) 
Interpretation ,2!_ negligence 
!,! unpredictable 
Every year the courts have many cases where they must try to find 
the line of demarcation between a negligent act or a pure accident 
where no individual is legally at fault. While pure accidents compose 
the largest percentage of cases, each case must be examined separately 
to establish whether or not negligence was involved. The interpreta-
tion of negligence by the courts can be very unpredictable. The cases 
cited show to some extent the variations that court rulings have had. 
In the case of Domino v. Mercurio, 234 N.Y.S. (2d) 1011, a 
playground supervisor and his district officials in New York were 
found negligent because they did not control the spectators. Injuries 
were sustained by a minor who fell over a bench and broke his leg 
when playing softball. The spectators, it was alleged, pushed the 
bench too near the third-base line. 
In another New York case, the court would not take the initiative 
to determine negligence but placed the case before a jury. The charge 
of negligence was that a principal instructed pupils to remain on the 
playground during an interval between examinations and did not provide 
adequate supervision. This action was brought by a pupil who was 
assaulted by a fellow student, while the pupils were on the playground 
between examinations. The court ruled that there was imposed upon the 
principal, by common-law, "both the duty to be reasonably vigilant in 
the supervision of the pupils and the liability for her negligent 
performance of such duty." (Ceanci v. Board of Education, 238 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 547) 
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Even when corporal punishment is involved, the verdict of negli-
gence is not clearly defined. For example, in an Iowa case the Iowa 
Court of Last Resort reversed the lower court's decision and remanded 
the case for trial by jury. In this case the teacher had allegedly 
struck the plaintiff on both sides of his face, breaking the pupil's 
eardrum when the pupil did not obey his orders. The lower court had 
directed a verdict for the defendant but the plaintiff appealed. The 
Iowa Court of Last Resort stated that a teacher is immune from liabili-
ty for corporal punishment if it is reasonable, but that the reason-
ableness of the punishment is a question of fact to be determined by 
the jury as was this case. ( Tinkham v. Cole, 110 N. W. ( 2d) 258 
(Iowa) 
Foreseeability & ~ 
The courts, in determining whether or not negligence is involved, 
try to determine if the defendant could have foreseen the consequences 
of his action or lack of action. For example, a home economics teacher 
may not be able to foresee that a student would get cut on a broken 
dish left by another student, where she could probably foresee the 
danger imposed by careless placing of sharp knives in a drawer. 
An actual case where the foreseeability of harm test was involved 
was that of a Washington school district which was held liable for 
injuries suffered by a nine-year-old girl when an old upright piano 
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set on casters which she and other children were moving tipped over. 
Permission had been granted to use the school room where the accident 
occurred. The piano, a top-heavy instrument, had been placed with its 
keyboard side against a wall, with just enough space for a small child 
to squeeze through. The court stated it was foreseeable that some 
child or group of children would want to use the piano and would try to 
move it. Consequently, reasonable minds could conclude that it was 
negligent for anyone to leave the piano in such a position where it 
might overturn if moved. (Kidwell v. School District No. 300, 
Whitman County, 335 P. (2d) 805 Washington, 1959) 
Contributory negligence 
When determining negligence, the courts must decide if the plain-
tiff in any way contributed to the accident. Contributory negligence 
is defined by law as conduct on the part of the injured person that 
falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own 
protection and which is a legally contributing cause, co-operating with 
the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the harm of which the 
injured person complains. (NEA Research Division, 1963, p. 13) 
A case in point is the Bensen v. South Kitsap District No. 402 
386 P. (2d) 137 (1963) case where the State Supreme Court considered 
whether the district was liable for injury suffered by a teacher on 
the school premises. This happened to be in the State of Washington 
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which is one of those states in which a school district is liable for 
injury caused by the negligent acts of district officers and employees. 
It appeared that on the evening of November 15, 1960, the teacher 
drove his automobile to the school building for a night function. It 
was a dark, rainy evening. He had parked in approximately the same 
place a number of times during three previous years while attending 
night functions. 
The district was engaged in certain construction on the school 
property. For three or four days before the accident occurred, 
employees of the district had been removing large stones from the 
construction site. At least two of these stones were left on the edge 
of the pavement which extended to the wall in that area, which was not 
lighted. While returning to his car later in the evening, the teacher 
was injured when he stumbled and fell over these rocks. He contended 
he did not see the rocks, but that by groping in the dark he discovered 
what he determined to be a rock about 18 inches high. There was 
evidence that the teacher, when being taken to the hospital, had said 
that earlier in the evening he had seen the rocks but had forgotten 
that they were there upon returning to his car. 
The case turned on whether there was contributory negligence by 
the teacher. An injured person may not recover damages from another 
who is negligent if the injured person's own negligence contributed 
to his injury. The question of contributory negligence is for the 
court or jury to decide. The court here said that there was sufficient 
evidence of contributory negligence by the injured teacher to call for 
a jury determination of whether that negligence in fact contributed to 
his injury. 
Areas .2f negligence 
Although the courts determine what constitutes a negligent act, 
each school employee should take it upon himself to know the danger 
areas in his state so as to avoid trouble. The following is a 
summary of some of the danger areas listed by Hamilton (1956). 
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(1) Corporal punishment, which is legal in most states. Any 
kind of corporal punishment should never be administered without anoth-
er school employee present. 
(2) Using a pupil as an agent, for example sending a pupil on an 
errand. This is a common practice for many teachers. There is no 
legal authority for this and must be used with caution. 
(3) Field trips which are part of our educational training in 
all grades of school now. The teacher who tries to provide such 
meaningful experiences for his pupils should always be assisted by 
other personnel on field trips if there are any dangerous obstacles. 
(4) Use of the personnel car by any school employee for trans-
porting pupils or other faculty members. Every employee should follow 
the laws of the state as far as insurance policies and receiving pay-
ment from the riders. 
(5) School patrols. The importance here is whether a teacher 
in charge of patrol operation is guilty of actual negligence if he 
places the safety of hundreds of school children in the hands of young, 
immature, school pupils. 
Other danger areas brought out by Bell (1965) include: 
(1) Supervision responsibilities. In order that parents realize 
that school personnel are responsible for the pupils only certain times 
of the day, parents should be informed of the hours when supervision is 
provided in the school buildings and on the school grounds. 
(2) Pupil illness or injury. The teacher is responsible to 
call the school nurse or the child's parents. Treatment other than 
emergency first-aid should not be given. 
(3) Parental permission slips. These slips have little legal 
value as responsibility can not be "signed away." The only value 
of these slips is knowledge of the parentsf willingness to allow the 
students to participate in activities. 
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Administrators and other employees must use an ounce of prevention 
in each decision they make to keep from living in constant fear. 
Even though they cannot guarantee that accidents will not result 
from their acts, they can assume the responsibility of acting as a 
reasonably prudent person would under the same or similar circumstances. 
EVOLUTION OF THE RULE OF TORT IMMUNITY 
Criticism 
Many states are beginning to revise their thinking about govern-
mental immunity. More and more judges are speaking out against tort 
liability. The courts, when changing the inn:nunity doctrine, have had 
many criticisms of the traditional rulings. Two major injustices are 
reviewed by the California Law Review (1961) as follows: 
The first injustice mentioned by the court was the un-
fairness of allowing an individual to go uncompensated simply 
because a governmental body happened to be the employer of the 
person who committed the tort. 
The second injustice noted is that which inheres in a 
legal system which superimposes upon normal rule of inmunity 
a patchwork of legislative and judicial exceptions, so that 
some victims of governmental torts are compensated for their 
injuries while others are not. (California~ Review, P• 772) 
The following cases show how some of the most prominent courts 
are tending away from this doctrine of immunity. 
Florida courts stated their objection when they spoke out against 
tort liability by saying, "We therefore, feel that the time has 
arrived to declare this doctrine anachoristic ,m not only to our 
system of justice but to our traditional concepts of democratic 
government." (Hargrove v, Town of Cocoa Beach, 60 A.L,R. (2d) 1193 
(1951) 
Another well quoted statement is from the California case 
Nuskoph v. Corning Hospital District 359 P. (2d) 457, (1961). 
"After a revaluation of the rule of governmental immunity from tort 
liability we have concluded that it must be discarded as mistaken 
and unjust." 
Guided by reason which ran head-on into established precedent 
of tort immunity, the State Supreme Court of Michigan as recently as 
1960 stated: 
••• Our concern is not with the family of the Middle 
Ages, with its tyrannies and abuses, but with the family of 
today. If this is the interest to be protected, and we conclude 
that it is, the law's protection should extend as well to the 
negligent as to the intentional injury. In each case, the loss 
is equally severe and the importance of the defendant's claims 
to immunity • 
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• • • We are now at the heart of the issue. In such circum-
stances, when her husband's love is denied her, his strength 
sapped, and his protection destroyed, in short when she has been 
forced by the defendant to exchange a heart for a husk, we are 
urged to rule that she has suffered no loss compensable at the 
law. But let some scoundrel dent a dishpan in the family kitchen 
and the law, in all its majesty, will convene the court, will 
march with measured tread to the halls of justice, and will there 
suffer a jury of her peers to assess the damages. Why are we 
asked, then, in the case before us, to look the other way? Is 
this what is meant when it is said that justice is blind? 
No, we see the suffering. But it is urged, that the 
precedents tie us. A wife, said the ancient precedents,could 
not sue because she was a legal nonentity. And, even if she 
could, she had no cause of action to assert because a servant 
has no "right" to the services of her master. (Montgomery v. 
Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.w. (2d) 227, 234) 
The Arizona courts have clearly stood against tort immunity in at 
least two recent cases. In the first case in 1962 they stated: 
It requires but a slight appreciation of the facts to realize 
that if the individual citizen is left to bear almost all the 
risk of a defective, negligent, perverse or erroneous administra-
tion of the States' functions, an unjust burden will become graver 
and more frequent as the government's activities are expanded and 
become more diversified. (Hernandez v. County of Yuma, 91 Ariz. 
35, 369 P. (2d) 271 (1962) 
Even more recently the Arizona Supreme Court stated its reason for 
changing the immunity doctrine. 
We are of the opinion that when the reason for a certain rule no 
longer exists the rule itself should be abandoned. After a 
thorough re-examination of the rule of governmental immunity from 
tort liability, we now hold that it must be discarded as a rule of 
law in Arizona. (Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 381 P. 
(2d) 107 93 Ariz. 384) 
New Jersey has also overruled the immunity law in their state. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated their case in this manner: 
The unmistakable fact remains that judges of an earlier 
generation declared the inmunity simply because they believed 
it to be a sound instrument of judicial welfare of the people 
of the state. When judges of a later generation firmly reach a 
contrary conclusion they must be ready to discharge their own 
judicial responsibilities in conformance with modern concepts 
and needs. 
It should be borne in mind that we are not dealing with 
property law or other fields of the law where stability and 
predictability may be of utmost concern. We are dealing with 
the law of torts where there can be little,if any, justifiable 
reliance and where the rule of !l decisis is admittedly limited. 
(Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A. 
(2d) 276, 283) 
Defense 
Some courts believe a revision of the constitution would be 
necessary before the innnunity rule could be changed because the im-
munity ruling is based on the constitution and statutes which have 
established that "school funds be disbursed solely for the support 
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and maintenance of public schools, and the provisions prohibiting the 
enactment of any law authorizing the diversion of school funds to any 
other than school purposes." They feel that use of these funds to pay 
damages is not a proper use of the school funds. (Hamilton, 1959, p. 280) 
When defending the immunity doctrine the courts very often refer 
to other cases where the precedence has already been set, as in the 
1964 Utah case ~hen the Utah Supreme Court denied Mr. Campbell, plain-
tiff in the case, the right to sue Granite School District and employees 
because of the precedence that public schools are protected by 
sovereign immunity. The court in this case quoted six other Utah 
cases that were denied the decision by the same opinion. 
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Another reason colllllOnly offered in support of the doctrine may be 
found in the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt 
from suit, not because of any formal conception or absolute theory, but 
on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right 
as against the authority on which the right depends." (Kawananakoa 
v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) 
In the past the majority of judges have accepted the governmental 
immunity law from tort liability. More recently, however, a greater 
number of magistrates are questioning this ancient law. 
LEGISLATION 
Abrogation h statute 
Since the doctrine of governmental inununity is in the common-
law, it can be changed by legislative statute. One such approach, 
utilized in a few states, is to basically abrogate the doctrine. 
California is one of the states that has imposed tort liability 
on school districts directly by statute. There are three statutes in 
this state relating to the question of liability. 
First, (California Government Code Sec. 53051) One which imposes 
liability caused by the defective or dangerous condition of 
buildings, grounds, works, or property of the district if the 
condition is not remedied after reasonable notice; second, a 
section of the motor vehicle act (California Vehicle Code Sec. 
17001) which makes a district liable for injuries or damage 
caused through the negligent operation of a motor vehicle owned 
by the district; and third, (California Education Code Sec. 903) 
a provision in the school code to the effect that a district 
shall be liable on account of injury to person or property arising 
because of the negligence of the district, its officers or 
employees. Taking these sections together they amount to a 
complete repudiation of the general rule and place school districts 
on the same basis as to liability as individuals or private 
corporations. (Hamilton and Mort, 1959, p. 286) 
An injured pupil may recover damages under these California pro-
visions provided the school district had knowledge or notice of the 
defect and failed to remedy the situation within a reasonable time 
thereafter. 
The state of Washington has imposed tort liability on school 
districts by statute in most cases but they do not waive immunity for 
accidents involving playgrounds, athletic equipment, field houses, or 
manual training equipment. This modification from complete exceptions 
was passed in 1917. (Washington Sherwood v. Moxes School District 363 
P. (2d) 138) 
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In addition to California and Washington, many other states have 
modified the immunity doctrine, to a limited extent, by statute. The 
legislature in Alabama created a State Board of Adjustment, which 
considers claims for damages done by the State or any of its agencies, 
commissions, boards, institutions, or departments. (Code of Alabama, 
1940, Title 55, Sec. 333) 
There was a case tried in Alabama that placed claims against the 
school districts within this category. The statutes limited the juris-
diction of the Board of Adjustment only to tort claims since they are 
the only ones to which the immunity rule would be applicable, and are 
the only cases of which the courts do not have jurisdiction. (Hamilton 
and Mort, 1959, p. 288) 
North Carolina modified the immunity law so that it affects 
"tort claims against county and city administrative agencies for 
injuries arising out of the operation of public school busses." The 
power to decide such claims is vested in the North Carolina Industrial 
Commission. When any damages are awarded by the Commission against a 
local board of education, the damages are to be paid by the State 
Board of Education. The total amount of damages which may be recovered 
under this statute is limited by law to ten thousand dollars per claim. 
(Hamilton and Mort, 1959, p. 289) 
The Mississippi statute waived immunity only within one area for 
schools, that is transportation. The recovery is limited to five 
thousand dollars, exclusive of court costs. This was protection given 
by the legislature for the general operating funds of the districts. 
The law requires each school district to contribute to the Accident 
Contingent Fund at the amount of five dollars annually for each school 
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bus operated by the district. Money from this fund is the only source 
authorized for payment of damages to injured children. (Hamilton and 
Mort, 1959, p. 288) 
The Minnesota legislature, however, reinstated governmental 
immunity of school districts after the State Supreme Court had issued 
its decision to abrogate the tort immunity doctrine, leaving the action 
subject to the legislature. In an unprecedented move in its regular 
1963 session, the legislature passed a statute which stays execution 
of the State Supreme Court decision with respect to school districts 
such that the immunity doctrine shall continue in complete force 
and effect to the same extent to which it bad previously been applied 
prior to the court rulings in the Spanel v. Mounds School District 
No. 621 case. 
(The statute) is hereby enacted as a rule of statutory law 
applicable to school districts or towns not exercising powers 
of villages in the same manner and to the same extent as it 
was applied in this state to school districts and such towns 
on or prior to December 13, 1962. The statute, unless amended, 
is law until July 1, 1968. (Minnesota Legislative Laws of 1963, 
Ch. 798., p. 795. 
The period of years was provided by the legislature for a 
comprehensive study of the implications of repealing the tort immunity 
doctrine in Minnesota. This action of the Minnesota legislature is 
another chapter of what different states seem to be doing to equalize 
their rules pertaining to the tort inununity doctrine of school districts. 
"Save-harmless" statutes 
A second legislative approach to governmental immunity is abroga-
tion in effect of that part of the iumunity doctrine dealing with 
liability of a district for the negligence of employees, for example 
the "save-harmless" statutes that are found in a few states. In 
New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Maine the laws are stated to 
the effect that a school district must hold any employee against 
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whom a judgment for negligence is rendered, harmless. In Wyoming, the 
districts are authorized, but not required, to reimburse the employee 
under the "save-harmless" law. The laws of these states require the 
school districts to reimburse the employee for any judgment rendered 
against him even though the injuries are generally acts resulting 
from the negligence of the employee. Hence, the districts cannot be 
sued directly but they nust "pick up the tab" if a judgment is awarded 
against the employee when the act complained of was committed while 
the employee was acting in the course of his assignment. (NEA 
Research Division, 1963, p. 23) 
A typical "save-harmless" case is Swainbank v. Coombs 115 A. 
(2d) 468 (Conn.). This case grew out of a law, which in part reads 
as follows: 
Each board of education shall protect and save harmless ••• any 
teacher or other employee ••• or any member of its supervisory 
or administrative staff ••• from financial loss and expense 
of alleged negligence or other act resulting in accidental 
bodily injury to ••• any person ••• provided such teacher 
••• or employee, at the time of the accident resulting in such 
injury ••• was acting in the discharge of his duties within 
the scope of his employment or under the direction of such 
board of education ••• 
In this case, action for assault and battery was brought against 
Mr. Coombs, the high school principal, and the board of education for 
which he worked. This case is significant because the court held 
that "a save-harmless law that merely requires or permits a board to 
save a teacher harmless and to protect him from financial loss in 
case of injury received by another which resulted from a negligent 
act of the teacher does not do away with the governmental defense of 
immunity from liability." 
"Safe-place" statutes 
A third category of legislative action comprises indirect excep-
tions to the governmental immunity doctrine covering schools. In 
this category is the "safe-place" statute. Such a statute makes 
public bodies liable for injuries sustained as a result of faulty 
construction or maintenance of public buildings. (Reutter, 1958, 
P• 28) 
There are a few state laws that specifically require school 
playgrounds to be kept in safe condition; without such a provision, 
the "safe-place" statute may be interpreted to cover buildings only, 
and not to extend to the school grounds, as in the case of Wisconsin 
where "safe-place" statutes only cover public buildings. (Wisconsin 
Statutes Annotated, Secs. 101.01, 101.06) 
A school district was held not liable under Wisconsin's statute 
when a flagpole on the playground broke and fell, killing a pupil. 
The court said that neither the school grounds, the sidewalk area 
surrounding the pole, nor the pole itself came within the meaning 
of the statutes. (Lawver v. Joint District No. 1, Mount Horeb and 
Blue Mounds, 288 N.W. 192 Wisconsin (1939) 
Many of the state legislatures are taking second looks at their 
statutes concerning the immunity doctrine. Since there are so 
many changes taking place, it is wise for school personnel to be 
aware of them. 
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COURT INTERPRETATIONS 
One of the ways through which changes in the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity covering schools have been made is through judicial 
opinions. Exceptions to the doctrine are discernible from an 
analysis of court hoidings when the courts simply deviate from the 
long-standing precedent. 
The most publicized court decision by a Supreme Court is the 
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 18 Ill. (2d) 11 
163 N.E. (2d) 89, 93 case in 1959 over a school bus pupil-injury 
action when the Court abrogated the Illinois immunity law. 
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Molitor, a minor, brought suit against the Kaneland Conmunity 
Unit School District for permanent personal injuries sustained by him 
when the school bus in which he was riding left the road, allegedly as 
a result of the driver's negligence, hit a culvert, exploded and 
burned. Molitor sought judgment in the amount of $56,000. 
In his complaint, the plaintiff made no allegation of the 
existence of insurance or other nonpublic funds out of which a judg-
ment against the Kaneland District could be satisfied. Although the 
record showed that the District did carry public liability insurance 
with limits of $20,000 for each person injured and $100,000 for 
each occurence, Molitor stated that he had purposely omitted such an 
allegation from his complaint. 
The District's motion to dismiss the complaint on the usual 
ground that a school district was inmune from liability for tort was 
sustained by the trial court and, on appeal, by the Appellate Court. 
Thereupon, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. 
In his brief, Molitor frankly recognized the Illinois rule 
established by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1898 that a school dis-
trict was immune from tort liability, but asked, in effect, that the 
rule be abo 1 ished .!!!. !2.!2.• 
The trial court ruled in favor of the school district, as did the 
Appellate Court. However, when the case was taken to the Supreme 
Court, this court reversed the previous rulings and sent the case back 
to the trial court where the damages were to be established. 
This case assumes importance for several reasons: First, because 
it deals with an issue that is assuming more and more significance 
for school districts. It raises the question of whether or not the 
long-accepted legal principle which grants tort immunity to a school 
district for the negligent acts of its employees and agents is an 
equitable one. 
A second reason for the importance assigned to this case lies 
in the fact that the court here ruled squarely on the issue of 
district immunity~~ without any qualifying conditions such as 
whether or not the district had applicable insurance coverage, or 
whether the acts complained of were governmental or proprietary 
in nature. 
The final reason is that the Illinois Supreme Court is reported 
being a highly respected one; and its decisions have carried con-
siderable weight in Wisconsin, Arizona, and Minnesota where they have 
had similar cases. (Roach, 1959, p. 53) 
In Washington there is a statute limiting governmental immunity 
to injruies from athletic apparatus and manual training equipment. In 
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all other areas, tort liability made school districts liable upon pre-
cisely the same basis as the individual or corporation is responsible. 
In a 1953 case, the judges abrogated the immunity law by stating: 
We closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, we can 
likewise open them. In holding a charitable institution liable 
for tortious conduct of an employee we stated: "The declaration 
of 'public policy' is primarily a legislative function. The 
courts unquestionably have authority to declare a public policy 
which already exists and to base its decisions upon that ground." 
(Washington Sherwood v. Moxee School District 363 P. (2d) 138, 
Washington) 
New York having the "save-harmless" statutes and the rule that 
applies only to tort liability of district officers and not to 
district employees or servants shows that the New York courts are 
willing to modify the tort immunity doctrine but not to abrogate the 
doctrine completely. An early case in New York against a school board 
was the Wahrman v. Board of Education 80 N.E. 192 case. The case was 
for the plaintiff because the board of education has the duty to 
provide and maintain buildings and equipment and is liable for their 
upkeep which cannot be escaped because they are a governmental agency. 
(Hamilton and Mort, 1959, p. 285) 
In Arizona, the Court abrogated the immunity doctrine on all 
governmental agencies in the case of Stone v. Arizona Highway 
Commission 381 P. (2d) 107. The action was based on a death resulting 
from an automobile accident caused by inadequate signs. Justice 
Lockwood held that the immunity doctrine was abolished not only for 
this case, but for all other cases that are not barred by statutes. 
The Arizona Supreme Court was also of the opinion that when the reason 
for a certain rule no longer exists, the rule itself should be abandon-
ed. They supported this belief in an earlier case--Hernandez v. 
County of Yuma 369 P. (2d) 271 (1962)--when they re-examined the 
immunity doctrine from tort liability and held that the doctrine must 
be discarded as a rule of law in Arizona. The court-made itmnunity 
rule is unjust or outmoded and is now under investigation. This 
doctrine was engrafted upon Arizona law by judicial decision and may 
properly be changed or abrogated by the same process. 
In Colorado, however, the change in immunity doctrine was short 
lived, lasting only three years. The Colorado Racing Commission v. 
Brush Racing Association 316 P. (2d) 582 (1957) was the case which 
abrogated the law but the same court invoked the immunity theory in 
the case Liber v. Flor 353 P. (2d) 590 (1960) 
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The courts have played a large role in changing the common-law 
doctrine of immunity. In several cases they have completely abolished 
the tort immunity of school districts. 
UTAH 
Court cases 
The history of tort cases against governmental agencies in Utah 
usually follows the pattern of case dismissal on the basic grounds 
of sovereign immunity. The following are typical cases tried in Utah 
where the courts have turned their backs on the injured individuals. 
At Provo, action was brought by a father as guardian of his 
minor son for damages sustained when his son was injured while coast-
ing on a coasting area which was University property but which was 
controlled by the city. The lower court entered judgment for the 
University and for the city, and the father appealed. The Supreme 
Court, McDonough, Judge, held that although the city controlled the 
roadway and designated it a coasting area, the city was not liable 
for injury to the child who coasted into the path of an automobile, 
since the city, in providing recreational facilities, was fulfilling 
a governmental function rather than a proprietary function. (Davis 
v. Provo City Corporation l Utah (2d) 244) 
In the Ramirez v. Ogden City 2 Utah (2d) 102 case, action was 
brought for personal injuries sustained when the plaintiff's dress 
came in contact with an unprotected gas heater and caught fire in 
the ladies' powder room of the city's community center. The lower 
court entered judgment for the city. The plaintiff appealed and the 
Supreme Court, with Corckett as Judge, held that the city was engaged 
in a governmental not a proprietary activity and was not subject to 
tort liability. 
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Another case where the immunity rule applied was Cobia v. Roy 
City 12 Utah (2d) 375. In this case, action was brought against the 
city for damage resulting in an isolated case from sewer stoppage. The 
lower court rendered judgment on the pleadings for the city, and the 
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court with Henroid as Judge, held 
that operation of the sewer was governmental and the city possessed 
governmental immunity from liability. The city did have a liability 
policy purporting to cover the loss, but still asserted the defense of 
sovereign immunity. Apparently the insurance was a waste of taxpayers 
money. 
Even in the case of a death, the courts have upheld the immunity 
rule. For example, Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake City 13 Utah (2d) 214 
was the case where action was brought against the city for the death 
of a child who drowned in a canal used by the city. The lower court 
rendered a judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The 
Supreme Court held that the city was not negligent and could not be 
held liable for the death of the two-year-old child drowned therein 
or any theory that it was under a duty to fence or baricade the canal. 
The most recent case in Utah that questions the governmental 
immunity doctrine is the case against the Granite School District, .--
their officials, and employees. This was for an injury sustained by a 
pupil in class which impaired the sight of his eye. It was caused 
when a metal particle was thrown by a machine during a shop class. 
The trial court granted the motion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
The plaintiff appealed but later conceded that the dismissal was 
supported by the prior pronouncements of the Supreme Court that school 
districts are acting as a state agent with the purpose of educating 
children and therefore can partake of its governmental immunity. 
In a convincing argument, plaintiff's counsel contended that 
this rule should now be judicially changed. However, despite the 
changes he cited of this immunity law by some states, the Utah courts 
were not persuaded of the propriety of changing this rule. The 
Supreme Court stated: 
It hu always been the law of this state and the activities, 
operations, and contracts of state government and other public 
entities protected by it are based upon that understanding of 
the law. For the reasons set forth in the cases heretofore 
decided by this court referred to above, we believe that if 
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there is to be a change which would have such an important effect 
upon public institutions and their operations, it should be left 
entirely to the legislature to determine whether the immunity 
should be removed; and as to what agencies; when effective, and 
to what extent, if any, limitations should be prescribed. 
(Campbell v. Pack 15 Utah (2d) 161) 
Deviation .i!,2!!! general trend 
A notable deviation from similar cases in Utah was the one in 
1950 when the judge disagreed with the total reign of the school 
district being immune from tort liability. This case was against the 
Ogden City School District for a negligent act. Justice Wolfe in 
dissenting stated: 
The doctrine is of judicial origin and judicial development 
growing out of the experience of a past age. Assuming that 
public policy at that time demanded the announcement of the 
doctrine, such is no longer the case. If the judiciary may 
develop law one way, it may also discard that law when conditions 
have changed so no longer make the rule applicable. (Bingham v. 
Board of Education of Ogden City 118 Utah 582) 
Concerning this same case, however,thc Utah Supreme Court stated 
that the legal power they have in tort cases is granted under the 
constitution. The power to make departments of the state respond in 
damages for torts rests with the legislature, and without legislative 
enactment they are unable to impose any liability or obligation upon 
school districts. 
Legislation 
Utah's governmental agencies will lose part of their innnunity 
from damage suits by injured citizens on July 1, 1966. After a long 
and extensive study, the Utah State Legislature has passed a law 
which in part abrogates tort immunity. 
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The new act which is a middle of the road law is a product of a 
study by a 21 member connnittee chairm.anned by Senator Charles Welch, Jr. 
and composed of legislators, representatives of cities, counties, 
school districts, special taxing districts, and the legal profession. 
The legislature provided a similar bill in 1961 but was vetoed by 
the past governor. The past governor's view stemmed primarily from 
fears that a waiver of irmnunity might bring on a rash of suits and 
judgments which could be ruinous to governmental units, particularly 
small ones. (Malmquist, April 4, 1965) 
With the change in governors and more complete study between 
1963 and 1965, the Utah Governmental Imnunity Act 1965, Senate Bill 
Number Four cleared the legislature and was passed by the new governor. 
Utah Senate Bill Number Four was patterned basically like a 
similar law enacted in California. Its cautious approach was to 
reassert the principle of governmental immunity from suit for injury or 
damage arising from the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. 
Part of the bill deals with what will or will not be waived and 
the method the state agencies are to use in officiating the law. The 
total effect of the waivers and the reassertions of immunity still 
does not place the governmental agencies on the same level as the 
private citizen to suits for its negligent or malicious actions. 
There are 38 sections to the bill. The following is a summary 
of the important sections pertaining to the public as well as school 
personnel. 
1. Government will still be iumune from exemplary or punitive 
damages. 
2. A plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the 
court, but in no case less than three hundred dollars, to reimburse a 
governmental agency for costs incurred by the agency if the plaintiff 
fails to prosecute the action or fails to receive judgment. 
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3. The amount of damages which may be assessed against a govern-
mental agency is limited by this act. 
4. A political subdivision, if unable to pay the claim during 
the current fiscal year, may pay the claim in ten equal installments 
or in such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant. 
5. Any suit of any contractual obligation is waived by the 
governmental agency. 
6. Immunity is waived for suits against the governmental agency 
for injuries resulting from negligent operation by any employee of a 
motor vehicle while on duty. But immunity is retained for the operation 
of emergency vehicles so long as they are being operated in accordance 
with the required law covering vehicles. 
7. Suits against all governmental agencies for any defective road, 
sidewalk, public building or other public improvements are also waived. 
8. The act retains government immunity from suits for damages or 
injuries arising out of the following: 
a. When an agency exercises or performs or fails to exercise 
or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused. 
b. Failure to make an inspection of any property or by 
reason of making an inadequate or negligent inspection. 
c. Assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with con-
tract rights, infliction of mental anguish, invasion of 
privacy or civil rights. 
d. The issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or 
failure to or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or similar 
authorization. 
e. Institution of judicial or administrative proceedings, 
even if malicious and without probable cause. 
f. Misrepresentation of any employee, even though it is 
negligent or intentional. 
g. Results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demon-
strations, mob violence, and civil disturbances. 
h. The act is in connection with the collection of and 
assessment of taxes. 
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i. The activities are by the Utah National Guard in the time 
of war or declared emergency. 
j. The individual is incarcerated in any place of legal 
confinement. 
9. All governmental agencies are authorized to purchase liability 
insurance or establish by themselves or with other agencies, a fund 
for the purpose of purchasing insurance or acting as a self-insurer. 
The insurance policies are specified that they must provide 
minimum liability coverage of $100,000 for each person, $300,000 for 
each accident, and $50,000 property damage. A governmental agency 
may insure all or any of its employees against all or any part of 
his liability for negligent acts and all insurance authorized by the 
act must be purchased or renewed by competitive public bid. 
Since the Utah legislature has seen the need for revision of 
the State statutes concerning tort liability, they have wisely 
studied the situation carefully. It remains to be seen if they have 
changed the laws for the greater good of the people. 
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CONCLUSION 
Summary 
The origin of iIIDllUnity from tort liability stems from an Eighteen-
th Century case in England. In the famed 1812 Mower case, an American 
judge based his ruling on England's decision. Later cases were tried 
and based on these two cases where the precedence had been set. Govern-
mental immunity from tort liability became the common-law. School 
districts, considered a function of the state, have not been liable 
in tort for injuries growing out of the negligent acts of their 
officers, agents, or employees. 
In the Twentieth Century, beginning with New York and Washington, 
the courts and legislators of several states have seen the need to 
revise and update the common-law of tort inmrunity. Just recently Utah 
revised the laws of that state, making them effective on July 1, 1966. 
As these Eighteenth Century rulings evolve into the Twentieth 
Century, many changes are taking place, and in all probability other 
changes will follow. 
Recommendations 
Perhaps the greatest opportunity for preventing the imposition of 
liability for negligence lies in safety education. A safety policy 
should implement procedures and practices that promote school safety 
through the instruction of school personnel. The standards formulated 
for the school policy would include the following: 
l. Procedures for school personnel to report dangerous practices 
and unsafe conditions when they become cognizant of the hazard. 
2. A system instituted for regular inspection of buildings, 
grounds, facilities, and equipment in order to uncover any dangerous 
condition. 
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3. Steps taken to promptly eliminate, repair, or correct defects 
and deterioration and to remove obstructions. 
4. Selection and training of competent personnel by the school 
districts. 
5. Training of all school personnel will include information on 
slander, false advice, and mental cruelty of students. 
6. Regular meetings held with all school personnel to review 
and evaluate school accidents and to consider ways of avoiding their 
recurrence. 
7. Development of reasonable regulations of student traffic 
in corridors, on stairways, and elsewhere on school premises. 
8. Adequate supervision provided for educational activities 
away from the school. 
9. Adequate supervision provided on the school grounds, gym-
nasium, and other areas in the school where large numbers of students 
congregate. 
10. Rules and regulations maintained for safe school bus trans-
portation. 
11. A system provided for investigation of all accidents and the 
requirement of prompt reports on each accident. 
Inasmuch as the statutes of each state do vary, it is necessary 
to be familiar with the application of these suggestions in each 
individual state and it is always wise to obtain legal counsel when 
there is a problem in any given situation. 
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